•A political economy rejoinder to Tanimu Yakubu’s fiscal framework
By Oyewole O. Sarumi PhD
Digital Transformation Architect
and Leadership Specialist
I. Introduction: Where Theory Meets the Street
Tanimu Yakubu’s article, ‘Reform is not windfall: Restoring revenue integrity, correcting price distortions’, published in May 2026, is one of the more intellectually rigorous documents to emerge from Nigeria’s policy establishment in recent memory.
As a senior official — Director-General of the Budget Office of the Federation — Mr. Yakubu writes with the authority of someone who not only understands the architecture of public finance but is actively engaged in reconstructing it.
His article deserves serious engagement, not dismissal.But serious engagement means honest critique. And after three decades of working on economic stabilisation, reform sequencing, and development transitions across emerging economies — from Indonesia’s post-Asian crisis recovery to Egypt’s IMF-guided restructuring, Brazil’s fiscal consolidation, and India’s liberalisation experience — I can say with some confidence that the article, while analytically correct in many of its theoretical assertions, exhibits a critical blind spot that no amount of textbook precision can fill.
It largely ignores the political economy of implementation, the sociology of trust, and the empirical record of what actually happens when shock therapy arrives without cushioning.
Nigeria is not a whiteboard. It is a society of over 220 million people, the majority of whom, as the World Bank’s April 2026 Nigeria Development Update has now confirmed, are living in poverty, with the poverty rate rising from 56 percent in 2023 to 61 percent in 2024 and further to 63 percent in 2025 even as inflation began to moderate.
That figure — nearly 140 million Nigerians in poverty — is not an abstraction. It is a political and moral reality that every framework for fiscal reform must reckon with honestly.This rejoinder engages Mr. Yakubu’s article section by section: commending where credit is due, challenging where the analysis falls short, and proposing what a more complete and politically viable reform architecture would look like.
I write not to score debating points, but because the stakes are too high for polite disagreement. The cost-push inflation that is currently grinding the purchasing power of ordinary Nigerians to dust is in large part the product of a reforms agenda that is correct in diagnosis but dangerously incomplete in execution.II.
II. Where Yakubu Gets It Right: The Analytical FoundationsLet me begin with intellectual honesty. There are several dimensions of Mr. Yakubu’s argument where he is unambiguously correct, and where public commentary in Nigeria has indeed been sloppy or politically motivated.
The Windfall Fallacy Yakubu is right to dismiss the notion that subsidy removal generates an instant cash windfall. This is a genuinely widespread misunderstanding, not only in public discourse, but among some state governors and political actors who expected rivers of money to flow into the Federation Account the moment pump prices were deregulated in May 2023.
Subsidy removal corrects a mispricing; it does not conjure new resources. The fiscal improvement is medium-term and trajectory-based, not immediately liquid. On this point, Yakubu’s invocation of the inter temporal budget constraint and the Tanzi Effect is pedagogically valuable.
However, let us add the data. Nigeria’s inflation rose from 22.41 percent in May 2023 to 34.19 percent by June 2024 — a 12-percentage-point surge that had direct, devastating consequences for real incomes. The nominal federation allocations did rise: FAAC distributions increased substantially between 2023 and 2024.
But as the Afrobarometer survey of March 2025 grimly documented, 95 percent of Nigerians reported that someone in their household went without a cash income at least once in the previous year. Food shortages were reported by 82 per cent; medical care shortages by 82 per cent; cooking fuel shortages by 79 per cent.
These numbers do not represent people who misunderstood the intertemporal budget constraint. They represent people in genuine distress.The Multi-Layered Subsidy ArchitectureYakubu’s framing of Nigeria’s subsidy regime as a multi-dimensional structure — spanning fuel pricing, foreign exchange management, and electricity tariffs — is analytically superior to the narrow ‘petrol price’ framing that has dominated media coverage.
He is right that each of these represents a variant of the same fiscal pathology: the underpricing of scarce economic resources, with costs absorbed by the state in various forms. The interconnected nature of these distortions means that partial reform — deregulating fuel but not addressing quasi-fiscal operations in NNPCL, or unifying the exchange rate without reforming the electricity sector — will yield incomplete results.
This integrated framing is one of the strongest intellectual contributions of the article, and it deserves to be amplified in policy circles.Revenue Leakage as the Core Problem perhaps the most important insight in Yakubu’s piece is his diagnosis of Nigeria’s fiscal challenge not as a revenue generation problem but as a revenue capture and retention problem.
He correctly identifies what political economists describe as a ‘porous fiscal state’ — a system in which public resources are partially recognised, partially retained, and partially absorbed into opaque institutional structures before they can enter the constitutional revenue chain.
The gap between what Nigeria earns from petroleum and what actually reaches the Federation Account has historically been staggering.
Executive Order 9, signed by President Tinubu in February 2026, directly addresses this by stripping NNPCL of its 30 per cent management fee and frontier exploration fund deductions from profit oil and gas under Production Sharing Contracts — deductions that were flowing off-budget under arrangements embedded in the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021.
The Nigeria Governors’ Forum has endorsed the Order, and the Federal Ministry of Finance estimates it will inject over N1.42 trillion into the Federation Account in 2026 alone. This is not trivial. Yakubu’s conceptual framing of ‘fiscal system closure’ is the right language for what this intervention is trying to achieve.
III. Where Yakubu Falls Short: The Political Economy Deficit Now to the harder conversation. Yakubu’s framework, for all its technical merit, is built on an implicit assumption that has rarely held true in the history of reform economics: that a technically sound diagnosis, correctly implemented by a committed government, will eventually produce the expected outcomes.
The problem is that economic reform is not an engineering project. It is a political, sociological, and institutional exercise that is mediated by trust, power, sequencing, and the capacity of the implementing state.
The Sequencing Problem: Shock Therapy Without Buffer The most consequential gap in Yakubu’s analysis is his insufficient engagement with reform sequencing. While he acknowledges the ‘paradox’ of good policy feeling constrictive, he frames this as an inevitable transitional discomfort — ‘every serious reform compresses before it expands.’
This is true as a general principle. But the operative question for political economy is not whether reforms compress before expanding; it is how long the compression lasts, how deep it goes, and who absorbs the burden.Nigeria implemented near-simultaneous shocks between May and December 2023: fuel subsidy removal, exchange rate unification, and electricity tariff adjustments.
The combination was not gradual; it was abrupt. And it arrived in an economy that was, by the president’s own admission at his inauguration, already on the edge: ₦77 trillion in public debt, 22.8 percent inflation, $7 billion in CBN foreign exchange arrears, and structural FX distortions accumulated over years of managed rate policy.
Contrast this with Indonesia’s approach, which has become something of a global benchmark. When Indonesia removed its fuel subsidies between 2014 and 2015, it did so after years of preparatory work: building a targeted cash transfer registry, expanding the BPNT food assistance programme, and creating institutional buffers to absorb price shocks.
According to the Nigerian Economic Society, ‘Indonesia’s phased approach to subsidy removal, coupled with targeted social safety nets, mitigated the immediate adverse effects on the poor.’ Indonesia’s GDP subsequently grew from $860.9 billion in 2015 to $1.37 trillion within a decade.
Nigeria’s per capita GDP, by contrast, sits at $842 in 2024 — below what it was in 2014.Egypt’s experience under the 2016 IMF programme is equally instructive. Egypt did not only cut subsidies; it simultaneously expanded its Takaful and Karama cash transfer programmes to reach millions of vulnerable households.
The World Bank explicitly advised that compensation measures work best when established before subsidy reductions begin. Nigeria, however, implemented removal abruptly — and the Conditional Cash Transfer programme, when it eventually arrived, was too small, too slow, and too poorly targeted to function as a meaningful buffer.
By the time N14 trillion in subsidy savings had been distributed across Nigeria’s 36 states and the FCT, a Socio-Economic Rights Accountability Project report in October 2025 found little evidence of improvement in infrastructure or public services.
The Trust Deficit: When Citizens Stop Believing political economy has a concept that technocratic frameworks consistently underweight: reform credibility. Reforms do not succeed on the strength of their theoretical soundness. They succeed when citizens believe — based on observable evidence — that the sacrifices demanded of them today will yield benefits tomorrow.
This is not sentiment; it is the foundational political economy of distributive bargaining.In Nigeria, that trust is at historic lows. The Afrobarometer March 2025 survey, the most comprehensive recent measure of public opinion on these reforms, is alarming reading. A full 85 per cent of respondents disapprove of the fuel subsidy removal.
Only 6 per cent believe the country is going in the right direction — a 31-percentage-point drop from 2017. Fewer than one in ten Nigerians rate the government positively on improving living standards of the poor (8per cent), managing the economy (7per cent), creating jobs (6per cent), narrowing the gap between rich and poor (5per cent), or — most strikingly — keeping prices stable (3per cent).
These numbers matter not just as a democratic metric, but as a reform sustainability variable. When the mass of citizens feel that reform costs are being socialised while reform benefits are being privately captured — by contractors, connected elites, and government officials — the political sustainability of the entire programme becomes fragile.
We have seen this dynamic play out repeatedly: Jonathan’s 2012 subsidy removal was reversed within weeks under ‘Occupy Nigeria’ protests; Buhari’s 2016 attempt was quietly re-introduced under pressure.
The Tinubu administration has shown more resolve. But resolve without redistribution is not a reform programme — it is an endurance contest that governments typically lose.The Fiscal Federalism Asymmetry: Diagnosed but Not Resolved Yakubu’s discussion of the asymmetry in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism architecture is accurate and important.
The problem he identifies — that revenues are pooled and shared while adjustment costs are borne centrally — is a structural flaw that creates perverse incentives: sub national governments benefit from federation allocations without bearing any of the macro-stabilisation burden.
This explains much of the political resistance to national reform and the ‘sharing without responsibility’ dynamic that has long characterised intergovernmental fiscal relations.But Yakubu stops where he should begin. Identifying the asymmetry is not the same as resolving it. The article offers no actionable proposal for fiscal federalism restructuring. In comparative terms, this is a significant omission.
In Canada, provincial governments have substantial taxation powers and bear corresponding service delivery obligations, creating a genuine alignment between fiscal authority and fiscal responsibility. In India, the Finance Commission model has been reformed to include performance-based transfers and stronger state-level accountability mechanisms.
Nigeria’s current structure, where states receive roughly 26.72 per cent of the federation account and local governments another 20.60 percent, with minimal own-source revenue capacity at either tier, is fundamentally incompatible with the kind of ‘fiscal federalism realignment’ Yakubu calls for in the abstract.
A serious proposal would involve granting states greater fiscal autonomy — particularly in property taxation, consumption taxes, and resource management — while conditioning federal transfers on measurable service delivery outcomes.
This is not impossible; it is politically difficult. But that is precisely the conversation the article avoids.
IV. The Growth Dimension: The Gap That Could Break the Reform There is a silence at the heart of Yakubu’s article that, to a political economist, is almost deafening. In eight sections of careful analysis, there is no serious engagement with the productive capacity dimension of Nigeria’s crisis.
Fiscal reform is treated as if it is sufficient in itself — as if closing revenue leakages and correcting price distortions will, in time, generate economic expansion. This is true in a narrowly fiscal sense. But it is incomplete in any serious development economics framework.Nigeria’s challenge is not simply fiscal imbalance; it is structural productive incapacity.
The country still imports refined petroleum products at scale, even as it sits atop one of Africa’s largest crude oil reserves. The Dangote Refinery, now operational and supplying a portion of domestic fuel demand, is a meaningful step. But it took three decades to arrive, and it remains a single private intervention in a sector that demands systematic state-coordinated industrial policy.
The IMF’s 2025 Article IV consultation with Nigeria acknowledges that GDP growth accelerated to 3.4 percent in 2024, driven mainly by hydrocarbon output and services. But agriculture remained subdued due to security challenges and sliding productivity — and it is precisely in agriculture, where roughly 70 per cent of Nigeria’s poor are located, that the subsidy removal has been most destructive.
Research by Raifu and Afolabi (2024) in Energy Research Letters modelled the inflationary impact of the 134 percent PMS price increase and found that rural inflation suffered disproportionately. The adjustment to long-run equilibrium could take approximately 24 months for rural areas — months during which rural households continue to absorb the full force of cost-push inflation without compensatory income growth.
The contrast with Indonesia and Malaysia, both of which simultaneously invested in domestic refining, agriculture, and manufacturing as they reformed their energy subsidy regimes, is stark. Nigeria removed the incentive to consume cheap imported fuel without simultaneously creating the domestic productive capacity to supply affordable alternatives.
The result is a situation where subsidy removal, rather than stimulating local production, simply transfers the cost to the consumer while maintaining the same import dependency.On exchange rate policy, Yakubu’s assertion that FX liberalisation ‘improves allocative efficiency and enhances long-term competitiveness’ is textbook-correct but context-dependent.
In economies with strong, diversified export sectors, a competitive exchange rate stimulates output and foreign earnings. In Nigeria, where the non-oil export base remains limited, currency depreciation primarily fuels import price inflation. The naira lost over 60 per cent of its value in the 18 months following unification.
The IMF notes that naira stabilisation and improved food production eventually brought inflation down to 23.7 per cent in April 2025 (on a rebased CPI). But the IMF’s own data shows that real GDP per capita has still not recovered to its pre-2016 level. For a country with 3.5 per cent annual population growth, GDP growth of 3.4 per cent means that the average Nigerian is, in real terms, getting marginally poorer every year.
V. Executive Order 9: Necessary but Not SufficientLet me turn now to the most operationally significant element of Yakubu’s article — his defence and contextualisation of Executive Order 9 of 2026. This is genuinely important policy, and the Budget Office’s role in its architecture should be acknowledged.
The Order does something specific and consequential: it strips NNPCL of the capacity to deduct a combined 60 percent — 30 per cent management fee plus 30 per cent frontier exploration fund — from profit oil and gas revenues before remitting to the Federation Account. The legal basis is the constitutional supremacy of Section 80(1) over conflicting provisions in the Petroleum Industry Act.
The immediate fiscal benefit is estimated at over N1.42 trillion in 2026 alone.This is not trivial, and Yakubu is right to argue that it represents a qualitative shift — from a permissive fiscal system to a rule-bound one. But there are at least three reasons why Executive Order 9, even if fully implemented, is insufficient as a standalone reform intervention.
First, the challenge is not merely administrative leakage; it is structural political capture. NNPCL’s revenue arrangements were embedded in the PIA with the full knowledge and participation of Nigeria’s legislative and executive establishment. They did not arise by accident or through bureaucratic inefficiency. They arose because they served powerful institutional interests. Closing them by executive order is a necessary corrective, but it does not address the underlying power dynamics that produced those arrangements in the first place.
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association’s immediate call for the Order to be withdrawn is a signal of the political resistance that will attend implementation.
Second, the emphasis on revenue remittance compliance focuses on the input end of the fiscal chain, but Nigeria’s fiscal corruption is also pervasive at the expenditure end. Multiple studies have documented that even when federation allocations flow correctly to states, they frequently disappear into procurement fraud, ghost worker payrolls, and inflated contract awards before they reach citizens in the form of services.
Executive Order 9 addresses the FAAC input; it does not address what happens downstream of distribution.Third, and most importantly, the Order is an executive directive — legally robust in constitutional terms, but institutionally fragile in political terms. The comprehensive legislative review of the PIA that the Presidency has indicated will follow is crucial.
Without legislative entrenchment and independent oversight, executive orders can be reversed, ignored, or captured. Brazil’s success in improving revenue capture did not rest on presidential directives alone; it rested on digital tax systems, integrated financial reporting, strong audit institutions, and — critically — prosecutorial independence.
Estonia’s near-total digitalisation of public finance is another benchmark: when every transaction flows through a traceable digital system, the scope for quasi-fiscal diversion shrinks dramatically. Nigeria’s reform architecture must move urgently in this direction.
VI. What a More Complete Reform Architecture Would Look Like let me move beyond critique to prescription. Based on the comparative evidence from Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil, India, and others — and accounting for Nigeria’s specific institutional context — a more complete reform architecture would need to integrate at least six dimensions that Yakubu’s framework currently elides.
1. Sequencing and Shock Absorption The evidence is unambiguous: the simultaneous delivery of fuel subsidy removal, exchange rate unification, and electricity tariff adjustments without pre-positioned social protection was a sequencing error with severe welfare consequences.
Going forward, any further price corrections — and there will be further corrections needed in the electricity sector — must be preceded by an operationalised social protection system with genuine reach. The biometric-based transfer system that Finance Minister Edun has described to the IMF is a step in the right direction. But Nigeria must be transparent about timelines, beneficiary numbers, and transfer adequacy.
A transfer of N8,000 per household per month is not an adequate buffer against transportation costs that have risen by 234 per cent.
2. Industrial and Productive Capacity InvestmentFiscal reform and industrial policy cannot be sequenced serially — they must run in parallel. The savings from subsidy removal must be visibly deployed into productive infrastructure: domestic refinery expansion beyond Dangote, agricultural mechanisation and irrigation, reliable electricity generation, and logistics infrastructure.
Citizens will accept short-term pain for long-term gain only if they can see credible evidence that the gain is being built. The invisible medium-term trajectory of the intertemporal budget constraint is not something that sustains popular support. Visible construction sites, improved grid reliability, and demonstrably cheaper domestic fuel are what do.
3. Technology-Driven Fiscal TransparencyExecutive Order 9 must be embedded in a technology architecture that makes leakage structurally difficult rather than merely legally prohibited. Nigeria should accelerate the full digitalisation of its public financial management system — including real-time tracking of FAAC flows, digital procurement platforms, and integrated IPPIS-linked public payroll management that eliminates ghost workers.
The Federal Inland Revenue Service’s digital transformation in recent years has shown what is possible. The same logic must be extended throughout the fiscal chain.
4. Fiscal Federalism RestructuringThe asymmetry Yakubu identifies cannot remain unresolved. Nigeria must move towards a system in which states are incentivised to develop own-source revenues — particularly through property tax reform and formalisation of the informal economy — rather than simply competing for their share of federation allocations.
Conditional federal transfers, tied to measurable outcomes in education, health, and infrastructure, would begin to align fiscal authority with fiscal accountability. 5. Rebuilding Governance Credibility in political economy terms, the linchpin of reform success is not the technical soundness of the policy framework — it is the credibility of the government implementing it.
Citizens must perceive that the rules apply to everyone: that the same government demanding sacrifice from the poor is visibly reducing its own consumption, prosecuting corruption, and ensuring that elite interests do not capture the gains of reform.
Rwanda — operating in a very different political context — demonstrates what happens to reform credibility when governance discipline is consistent and visible. Nigeria’s elite consumption, bloated government overhead, and absence of high-profile accountability prosecutions are eroding the social contract that reform sustainability requires.
6. Communication as a Reform ToolFinally, Yakubu’s article, sophisticated as it is, was written for a technical audience. Fiscal reform requires not only analytical rigour at the top but clear, honest, and consistent communication downward. The gap between the government’s technical understanding of what it is trying to achieve and the population’s lived experience of rising prices, deteriorating services, and deepening poverty is itself a governance failure.
Countries that have sustained difficult reforms — think of India under Manmohan Singh’s liberalisation in the early 1990s, or Indonesia under Jokowi — invested heavily in communicating not just the direction but the concrete benefits as they materialised. Nigeria has been weak on this dimension.
VII. Conclusion: From Fiscal Correction to Human DevelopmentTanimu Yakubu’s article is a serious and valuable contribution to Nigeria’s fiscal policy discourse. Its diagnosis of the windfall fallacy, its integrated treatment of the multi-layered subsidy architecture, and its identification of revenue leakage as the central structural problem are all analytically sound and deserve wide circulation among policymakers, legislators, and civil society leaders.
Executive Order 9, which Yakubu effectively contextualises, represents a meaningful advance in the effort to bring Nigeria’s petroleum revenues fully within the constitutional fiscal chain.But a technocratic diagnosis of what must change is not the same as a political economy strategy for how to make that change without destroying the social contract in the process.
The evidence from Nigeria’s own recent experience — confirmed by the World Bank, the IMF, Afrobarometer, and a growing body of domestic research — is that the current reform programme, while directionally correct, has been implemented in a manner that has caused disproportionate harm to the most vulnerable, without the compensatory mechanisms, productive investments, or governance reforms needed to make that harm politically and morally acceptable.
The path forward requires more than closing fiscal leakages and correcting price distortions. It requires sequenced reform delivery with genuine shock absorption, technology-driven transparency that makes corruption structurally difficult, a restructured fiscal federalism that aligns incentives with responsibilities, aggressive industrial policy that builds domestic productive capacity alongside fiscal discipline, and — perhaps most urgently — a rebuilt social contract in which citizens can see, feel, and trust that their government is both competent and honest.
Reform, as Yakubu correctly insists, is not a windfall. But without credibility, coordination, equity, and demonstrable delivery, it risks becoming something worse than a windfall deferred: a prolonged hardship that erodes the very institutional legitimacy that functional fiscal states depend upon.
Nigeria can afford neither the old distortions nor a new technocracy that is indifferent to the human cost of its own prescriptions.The reconstruction of Nigeria’s fiscal architecture must be matched, step for step, by the reconstruction of Nigerians’ faith in their state.
About the AuthorProf. Sarumi, a digital transformation architect and leadership strategist with over 40 years of cross-sector experience across Nigeria and the African continent, writes from Lagos.
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